This paper studies corporate tax competition if it is costly to learn some of the elements that determine the effective tax burden. Search cost may, but need not, eliminate the tax competition pressure. The outcome depends on the boundaries of tax rate and tax base choices. Search cost can explain the empirically observed tax cuts cum base broadening.
Introduction
This paper introduces search cost in the theory of tax competition. It studies tax competition in search markets for foreign direct investors when the statutory tax rates are known but the e¤ective tax base is not known, causing search costs to …rms which are trying to …nd out countries' e¤ective tax burdens prior to the investment location choice. 1 Tax rates of di¤erent countries are typically well advertised and known or are accessible virtually without cost. It is much more di¢ cult to learn the details of a country's tax rules, such as depreciation allowances, tax treatment of R&D investment, treatment of capital gains, the integration of corporate taxation with other elements of the national tax system, a country's …nancial regulation and its rules regarding transfer pricing. A …rm needs to know and to assess what these rules imply for tax optimization and for the resulting e¤ective tax base for a given investment project. 2 We …nd: as a variant of Diamond's (1971) monopoly pricing paradox 3 , the cost of learning countries'e¤ective tax base has drastic consequences for the equilibrium outcome of tax competition. 4 From a structural point of view, Harrington and Leahey (2007) is closest to our paper. They consider price competition between …rms with unobserved delivery costs adding to sales prices. In our framework, countries compete for …rms, and the (observed) tax rate and the (unobserved) tax base inter- act multiplicatively. We show that competition pressure may occur, despite the existence of search cost, depending on the size of the minimum feasible tax base. Our results show why competition can lead to a tax-cut-cumbase-broadening and explain this recent trend in the context of corporate taxation. It contributes a further explanation for the puzzle 5 as to why corporate tax rates dropped in the last 25 years in OECD countries, whereas tax revenues from corporate taxation were sustained. 6 2 The formal framework
We look for (weak) perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the following game with complete, but imperfect, information. There are n ex-ante identical countries j = 1; :::; n, and a set of investors i with measure 1. 7 Each country chooses a statutory tax rate t j 2
The product of tax rate and tax base in a country is called the e¤ ective tax burden and denoted
This T j is the …scal price which investors have to pay for investing in country j: Each investor maximizes his net pro…t. He costlessly observes the statutory tax rates t 1 ; :::; t n . The e¤ective tax bases b 1 ; :::; b n are determined by a large number of details in the tax code such as depreciation rules or cost deduction allowances, the conduct of the tax administration, for instance, regarding transfer pricing issues or auditing habits, on speci…c characteristics of the investment project and its ‡exibility for tax optimization in the respective institutional framework. Evidently, b j should be understood as a metaphor for the less easily observable co-determinants of e¤ective tax burden. To learn the actual b j of country j the investor has a positive cost that is equal to c > 0. To learn the tax bases of a set K i f1; :::; ng of countries, the search cost is equal to (#K i )c, with #K i the number of countries in K i . For these countries j 2 K i , investor i knows the e¤ective tax burden T j . For all j = 2 K i , i must form a belief about T j , described by a (possibly degenerate) probability distribution F j (T j ). Each investor invests one unit of capital (or does not invest at all). 8 The investment turns into a gross pro…t of size (T j ). For this function, we assume that a higher tax rate reduces this gross pro…t. More precisely, (0) is the 'laissez-faire'pro…t, is a concave function of T j (i.e., 0 < 0 and 00 0) in the range T j 2 [0; 1] and zero for T j > 1. Intuitively, this is a short-hand notion for the idea that …rms adjust their local business activity to taxation, that their activity will be negatively a¤ected by a higher e¤ective tax burden, and that …rms have an exit option, which rules out an in…nitely high tax burden. The gross pro…t is subject to the e¤ective tax burden. Hence, the pro…t net of taxes and net of search costs for the investor i who expends (#K i )c units of search costs and invests in country j is
Each government maximizes its tax revenues. 9 If j 2 (0; 1) is the share of investors who invest in country j, then the tax revenue in country j is
where j can, in general, be a function of ((t 1 ; b 1 ); :::; (t n ; b n )) We consider the following timing. Stage 1: the countries choose their statutory tax rates and their tax base de…nitions. Stage 2: the investors choose which information they will acquire about tax base de…nitions. Stage 3: investment choices take place.
It is useful to de…ne the following benchmark: in the absence of tax competition, j is exogenous. This makes (3) a monotonic and concave function of the e¤ective tax burden and has a unique maximum that is implicitly de…ned by the …rst-order condition
We denote the solution to (4) as T m and call T m the e¤ ective monopoly tax.
Proposition 1
The following strategy pro…le and beliefs constitute a weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium: (i) For 0 1 < T m : All countries choose t j = 0 and b j = 1 . Investors believe that
with probability 1. They choose K i = ? and invest in one of the countries with the (according to the beliefs) lowest e¤ ective tax burden.
(ii) For 0 1
with probability 1. They choose K i = ? and invest in one of the countries with the lowest (believed) e¤ ective tax burden.
Proof. (i) In stage 3, each investor i knows b j for j 2 K i and has beliefs (5) about countries' b j for j = 2 K i . The investor chooses the country with the lowest t j b j and randomizes between the di¤erent countries if there are several countries with the same e¤ective tax burden. In stage 2, each investor i observes t 1 ; :::; t n and chooses K i . Given that the beliefs (5) are degenerate, the investor does not expect to learn anything from search. Hence, K i = ?. Turning to stage 1, for t k = 0 ; b k = 1 for all k 6 = j, the country j chooses (t j ; b j ) to maximize (3). For t j > 0 and given the beliefs in (5), all investors expect the …scal burden to be higher in this country than in the other countries. The country receives a tax revenue equal to zero in the continuation game. For t j = 0 , its expected tax revenue is equal to
and, as 0 1 < T m , this reaches its maximum for b j = 1 . Note also that the beliefs are consistent along the equilibrium path.
The reasoning for case (ii) is analogous for stages 2 and 3. In stage 1, countries anticipate that K i = ?. Given the simultaneous choices t k b k = T m for k 6 = j, country j anticipates that j's tax revenue is equal to
Accordingly, j chooses t j 2 [T m = 1 ; T m = 0 ] and a tax burden de…nition that maximizes t j b j (t j b j ) for this t j . This maximand is b j = T m =t j . Note also that the beliefs are consistent along the equilibrium path. Cases (i) and (ii) have in common that no search costs are incurred. Given the expectations of identical equilibrium e¤ective tax base choices in the di¤erent countries, a costly search does not pay. In turn, because no …rm searches, countries cannot attract additional investors by the choice of a low e¤ective tax base. If the …rms could commit to search actively, this would introduce competitive pressure, as a country j that reduces b j is rewarded with additional investment. Such search is, however, not time consistent. As a result, competitive pressure is limited for case (i) and vanishes completely for case (ii).
In case (ii) the tax burdens are equal to the tax burdens in autarchy. This result closely corresponds with the original result in Diamond (1971) and the recent result on additive two-component prices by Harrington and Leahey (2007) .
The more important result is for case (i). It shows that, despite the absence of search in the equilibrium, the costless observability of the tax rate exerts some partial competitive pressure on the e¤ective tax burdens. As the tax base is bounded from above, the maximum possible e¤ective tax burden can credibly be limited by the country if it chooses a tax rate that is so small that the product of this tax rate with the maximum possible (unobserved) tax base is smaller than the e¤ective monopoly tax (i.e., if Search cost for the e¤ective tax burden is typically assumed away in tax competition analysis. However, if there is a cost to learning the true size of some of the determinants of the actual e¤ective tax burden, this may limit the amount of competition pressure and may even support a tax competition equilibrium in which countries choose the e¤ective tax burden that maximizes tax revenue, just as in the case with autarchy. The result is compatible with a large variety of combinations of tax rates and tax bases and may add to the existing explanations for why the trend towards lower statutory tax rates occurred in parallel with the increase in international openness in recent decades, and why it was complemented with a broadening of the corporate tax base.
